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I have been involved with the commercial expendable launch vehicle business from the
very beginning to the present.  In reviewing the ups and downs over the past quarter century, I
am struck by how much influence that U.S. policy makers have had on the course and fate of
this private business.  Let me lead you through it.
The Early Years
For the first 20 years of the space program, all those of the free world who wished to
place a payload into space had to request launch services from NASA.  The first commercial
satellite was the ATT Telstar in 1962.  From then until about 1982 any country or company who
wished to place a satellite into orbit was forced to use a Delta, Atlas or Titan launch vehicle
whose design, production, operations, schedule and price were controlled by NASA.  NASA had
monopalistic control over the entire free worldÕs access to space.  This resulted in occasional
controversies with customers, particularly over price and schedule.   There were even com-
plaints about NASA arrogance on occasion.  (As a NASA man at that time, I donÕt remember
that part.)
Emergence of Ariane and Space Shuttle
This NASA monopoly was at least a contributing factor to the European decision to rush
the development of their own rocket, Ariane.  The Space Shuttle was getting ready to fly about
the same time so NASA decided that there would be no more orders for the U.S. ELVÕs.
1978 USG Policy - Cease ELV production.  Put all U. S. needs on the Space Shuttle
The strategy was that the only launch vehicle needed by the U.S. was the Shuttle.
NASA believed that the Shuttle would become operational about the same time that all of our
ELVÕs were used up.  Unfortunately, the timing of that strategy was not good.  The Shuttle was
delayed substantially.  The first flight was in 1981.  Ariane had some infant mortality problems in
test flights which were soon overcome.  It was declared operational in 1982.  The U. S. soon
found itself in the position of playing catch up in providing launch services for commercial
customers.
From the earliest days, we at NASA underestimated the complexity of the Shuttle de-
sign, testing, operations, and turnaround requirements.  I recall some  of the first estimates (or
at least targets) made about 1978 were for 60 missions per year and a 160 hour mission turn-
around.  Instead in the first four years, only 13 missions were flown.  Now it was Ariane that was
developing a near monopoly.
1983 USG Policy - Industry is encouraged to develop a commercial ELV adjunct to counter
foreign competition.
In 1983 our government issued a call to industry encouraging proposals to privatize the
U. S. government-developed ELVÕs.  In December General Dynamics received a letter from
NASA authorizing commercial sales of launch services on the Atlas launch vehicle.  Similar
letters were sent to other companies regarding the Delta and the Titan.  The U. S. commercial
ELV industry was underway - NOT!
1983 USG Policy - Continue flying commercial satellites on the Shuttle using an additive pricing
formula.
To maximize the Shuttle share of the commercial satellite market, NASA established a
very liberal pricing policy.  If I recall correctly, for one of the early satellites, on which General
Dynamics bid for the launch services, NASA offered a price of $9 million.  The Atlas price was
$43 million.  Needless to say, General Dynamics didnÕt make any sales and neither did the other
ELV companies.  This commercial rocket industry couldnÕtÕ get off the ground.  No pun intended.
One of the innovative pricing formulas used by NASA was to charge by length of the
payload bay that was used.  This in turn led to satellite design innovations also.  For example,
Hughes designed the Syncom to be the same diameter as the payload bay but as short as
possible.  It looked like a tuna can.  This lowered the price to ride on the Shuttle but made that
design unsuitable to use an ELV as a back-up.
The Challenger Accident
Then came the shocking Challenger accident in early 1986 and the accompanying soul
searching by the whole nation.
1986 Policy - No longer allow commercial satellites on the Shuttle, with certain exceptions
Among the many aftermaths of Challenger came a policy pronouncement by President
Reagan in late 1986 that the Shuttle would no longer be authorized to manifest commercial
satellites, with a few special exceptions.  Now the commercial U. S. ELV launch services indus-
try really could get underway Ñ if they dared to try to compete with Ariane.  Ariane was now well
established and the only launcher able to respond immediately to the commercial customersÕ
needs.
It was several years after corporate decisions to proceed before vehicles could be
produced and agreements for use of government infrastructure finalized.  The first commercial
Atlas was not launched until 1990; the first commercial Delta somewhat earlier.  Titan, the
largest U. S. ELV, had a difficult time with sales because there were few, if any, satellites large
enough to require the Titan performance.  Martin Marietta eventually dropped out of the com-
mercial competition.
Customers seeking launch services were delighted that there was now a competitive
market with the larger supplier base.  The launch services business was growing across the
board.  This was duly noted by other countries.
1988 USG Policy - Do not allow non-market economy countries to cause ELV market disruption.
The first new entrant to the market was China - a non-market economy country.  As
such, they donÕt even keep books that would tell them how much it cost to produce and launch
their vehicles.  Their interest was in the prestige, the technology gains, and the hard cash.  With
no concern about profit they could price their services at any level they chose.  In theory they
could badly cripple the U.S. and European business.
The challenge to our government was how to encourage China into the market without
allowing market disruption of the western world.  The result was the first agreement on commer-
cial launch services between the PRC and the U. S. which was signed in 1989.  This agreement
basically places constraints on PRC as to the number of western satellites they can launch in
the period of the agreement and places a lower limit on the price they can charge to be Òon a
parÓ with western providers.
Later, the early 90Õs, Russia wanted to be a player and so did the Ukraine.  Lockheed
struck an agreement to market the Russian Proton and Boeing entered into a joint venture with
the Ukraine to use Zenit in their project called Sea Launch.  Since both Russia and Ukraine are
non-market economies, the same concerns of market disruption exist as with China.  As a
result, there are launch agreements with constraints similar to those with China.
The basic purpose of these agreements is to protect the U. S. industry.  Now with Boeing
having assimilated McDonnell Douglas and working with Ukraine while Lockheed has merged
with Martin and is marketing Proton, it is not a far reach for the industry to quote Pogo:  ÒWe
have met the enemy and they is us.Ó
These trade agreements, which address GEO satellites, expire in 2000 or 2001.  The
betting is that our government may decide that they have served their purpose of preventing
market disruption and they will not be renewed after that date.  A possible exception is the
Chinese agreement in which the pricing constraint may be retained since they are not involved
with any U. S. launch companies.
The picture as far as large vehicles placing satellites into orbit is fairly stable at the
moment, but in the last several years efforts to develop networks of low orbit and medium orbit
satellites have exploded.  Launches of a multiple number of these small satellites are being
done by the larger vehicles, but the world senses a large market for smaller rockets and there is
a plethora of such developments underway.  Space News summarized this group in a recent
issue and the number is staggering.  Many of the names I had never heard of.  In a recent
competition 23 launch vendors applied!  One of the new efforts is Kistler, a returnable vehicle to
be launched late this year.  I find this particularly interesting because the key personnel are old
Apollo leaders with whom I worked in earlier years.
Some of the entries are offered by non-market economies so the basic problems of
market disruption must still be addressed.  Russia, for example, is offering several forms of
weapon systems.  This is viewed with alarm by companies such as Orbital Sciences who made
large investments in developing their Pegasus and Taurus rockets.   The government has been
deliberating this subject and new trade agreements similar to the present ones are very likely to
stave off market disruptive forces.
The Future
But it has been difficult to hold the status quo in the commercial ELV business.  Now
there is concern about a possible new policy.
?? 1998 USG Policy - Allow the Shuttle again to fly commercial satellites??
The United Space Alliance (USA) is charged with making the Shuttle operations less
expensive.  Although undoubtedly ways will be found to make the current system more efficient,
by far the most leverage is obtained by increasing the flight rate.  To the first order, doubling the
flight rate reduces by one-half the cost per pound to orbit.  The Ò problem is finding a sufficient
number of payloads.  Space News reported recently that USA proposes to begin flying commer-
cial payloads aboard the Shuttle within a year and privitizing the four-Orbiter fleet by 2002.
The strategic planning for Shuttle usage is of major importance to NASA and indeed for
all of us.  The Shuttle interaction for building and supplying the Space Station has major pro-
gram and foreign policy implications.  It seems obvious that plans for privatizing the four Orbiter
fleet must be strongly related to reducing the cost of operations.
This new government policy under consideration would again allow the Shuttle to fly
commercial satellites.  This policy is strongly championed by many in NASA and some influen-
tial Congressmen.  If it becomes our national policy it seems to me there is danger, as the clich
says, of Òdeja vu all over againÓ.  Back in 1981-86, when carrying of commercial satellites was
permitted on the Shuttle, the price was low; and NASA could not compete with foreign competi-
tion because of schedule.  Giving U. S. industry permission to provide commercial launch
services went nowhere because our industry couldnÕt compete with the NASA innovative Shuttle
pricing.  One must question just what would be different now?
a) With any Shuttle launch there is a very small but finite chance of an accident.
The American public must be convinced that risking human life for satellite delivery is worth
doing when unmanned. This Òuse of peopleÓ argument can be made for exploring the moon or
manning the space station but it is much more difficult to make when the Shuttle is used basi-
cally as a delivery truck.
b) For any launch with humans on board, safety of flight is paramount.  Delays to
ensure absolute safety is not unusual.  As a result, adherence to schedule is more difficult than
with ELVÕs.  This is a parameter of major importance to the satellite customer.
c) Satellite builders today like to design to be able to fly on at least two of the
existing ELVÕs.  They will recognize that a generic problem with the Orbiter fleet could ground
them all for an appreciable period of time.  After Challenger there were no Shuttle flight for over
600 days.  They are not likely to make the mistake that Hughes did in the early days of optimiz-
ing the Shuttle design to fly in the Orbiter but it wouldnÕt then fit on an ELV backup.
d) NASA in the early Ô80Õs used marginal or additive cost definitions for determining
the price for carrying a commercial payload.  The philosophy ÒWe are going anyhow; it wonÕt
cost much more to add this commercial package, Ò wonÕt be used if the Orbiter fleet is priva-
tized.  The operator wants to make a profit after dividing the total costs among the paying
customers.  From my past knowledge of Shuttle operations, which admittedly is well out of date,
I have grave doubts of a private Shuttle operator being able to compete with nay of the existing
ELV launch providers without government support.
e) One might argue that the demand for launch services is growing by leaps and
bounds, so there is room for Shuttle in the market.  The counter to this is that the supply of
launch providers appears to have grown at least as much as the demand.  This continuing
balance of supply and demand is inherent with a free market operating.
f) If this policy were to pertain, and the Shuttle price can be competitive, it is difficult
to conjecture what the effect would be on other players in the market.  In 1997, there were 28
launches of the large vehicles in the international market, mostly for GEO satellites.  A recent
news story talked of possibly doubling the Shuttle launch rate from the present 8 per year to 16.
If this were possible, and if one assumes that the additional 8 would carry just 2 commercial
GEO satellites per mission, this would mean that this segment of the 1997 ELV market would be
reduced by 57%!
g) The U. S. commercial ELV industry was encouraged and aided by government
policies and congressional enabling legislation, and today is healthy with a long and promising
future.  Industry strategic planning assumed a stable government policy which led to the invest-
ment of literally billions of dollars of corporate funds in programs like the Delta 3 development,
the Atlas family including the new Atlas IIAR, the mammoth Sea Launch project of Boeing and
team, and the Ariane 5.  When one adds all of the launchers being developed for LEO and MEO
satellites, that investment is probably doubled.  Surely this commitment by industry needs to be
taken into account as this new policy is debated.
My personal conclusion is that on balance the policy regarding use of the Shuttle should
remain as it presently is.  This states that the Shuttle can be used for those  satellites which (1)
require man tending, (2) are too large for any available ELVÕs , or (3) have special foreign policy
implications.  The focus should be on maximizing the payloads for the Orbiter which require the
presence of people Ñ manufacturing, satellites that are launched and retrieved, earth observa-
tion, any experiment that requires returning instruments or data to the earth, etc.  I also think
foreign entities, countries or companies should be marketed strongly for Shuttle flights of these
types of payloads.
In summary, the commercial ELV industry has grown into a booming business.  It far
exceeds anything that I envisioned 20 years ago.  A key lesson we have learned is that govern-
ment policy decisions have played a major role all along the road Ñ and likely will continue to
do so in the future.  WeÕll see.
